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Abstract
Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large
multinational enterprise, whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms.
The firm has private information about its eﬃciency and about spillovers. It is shown
that the firm may gain from governmental tax coordination. Relative to a cooperative
tax agreement, tax competition may induce excessive investments in the country where
the positive spillover eﬀects are lowest. Also, with suﬃciently asymmetric spillovers,
investments under competition will be excessively spread out, not properly concen-
trated to the country where spillovers would be largest. Equilibrium outcomes in the
taxation game depend on the firm’s ownership structure, and the firm as well as the
governments may wish to influence this structure to aﬀect the equilibrium.
1 Introduction
National governments compete to attract investments frommultinational enterprises (MNEs),
in particular from enterprises that may generate positive spillover eﬀects (positive exter-
nalities) for national firms. Given the characteristics of MNEs1, e.g. technically complex
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1MNEs tend to be important in industries characterized by a high value of intangible assets, a large share
of professional and technical workers in their work force, products that are new or technically complex,
and high levels of product diﬀerentiation and advertising (Markusen 1995).
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products, there is every reason to believe that such a firm is better informed about its
operations than are any of the national governments that it relates to. The international
nature of an MNE and the high number of interfirm transactions also make it hard for tax
authorities to observe true income and costs. Countries that try to attract investments
from such a firm, must then take informational asymmetries into account in their policy
design.
An interesting and from a policy perspective important issue is whether competition
leads to misallocations in the sense of investments becoming too much spread out, not
properly concentrated in the country where they would yield the largest spillovers. The
model presented in this paper shows that tax competition does have this eﬀect when
the MNE has private information regarding spillovers, and these spillovers are suﬃciently
asymmetric between countries. Comparing non-cooperative and cooperative investments
in such cases, we find that non-cooperative investments are either higher in both countries,
or higher (respectively lower) than cooperative investments in the country where spillovers
are low (respectively high). With highly asymmetric spillovers there is thus a tendency for
tax competition to induce investments that are either overall too high, or skewed towards
overinvestments in the country with low spillovers combined with underinvestments in the
country with high spillovers.
To avoid a damaging race-to-the-bottom tax competition, countries may strive to coor-
dinate their tax policies. We examine the likely eﬀects of tax harmonization, by comparing
investment and profit levels in cooperative and non-cooperative tax equilibria. We find,
among other things, that there is lower investment — and lower profits for the firm — under
competition than under coordination if spillovers are small, investments are not too close
substitutes, the cost of public funds is small, and/or domestic owner shares are large. The
latter observation indicates that international cross-ownership is to the benefit of the firm.
When the MNE has private information, its ownership structure aﬀects the outcome
of the tax competition game because national owner shares influence the national gov-
ernments’ motives to extract rents from the firm. (This may explain why governments
are concerned with local ownership; many countries attempt to secure minimum national
ownership stakes in firms that invest locally, e.g. by indigenisation requirements.) In the
case of asymmetric spillovers, we find that the firm prefers a larger owner share by share-
holders in the country where the spillovers are largest. Total welfare, however, is largest
when ownership is split more equally among investors in the two countries.
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We consider a multi-principal regulation model of an MNE. The MNE (the agent)
allocates its real investment portfolio between two jurisdictions, and has an option of
redirecting parts of the investments from one of the jurisdictions to the other. The firm is
assumed to have private information about its net operating profits and its productivity
in the two countries. It is also assumed to have superior information about the potential
positive spillovers that its activity may generate. As a part of a tax bargaining strategy
the firm may then have an incentive to misrepresent its earning potential and the extent
of spillovers in each individual country. Also, having investment opportunities in several
countries, the MNEmay try to reduce tax payments in each country by an implicit threat of
directing a larger fraction of its investment to the neighbouring country. The governments’
challenge in this setting is to cope with private information in taxing MNEs, and at the
same time encourage investment-induced spillovers on national firms.
After this introduction the model is presented in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 consider
cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria, respectively, and discusses related literature.
Spillover eﬀects are analysed in detail for parametric functions in section 5, and section 6
concludes.
2 The model
We model a tax bargaining situation between a unique, large MNE (agent) and two in-
dependent countries (principals).2 There is strategic tax competition between the two
countries where the firm is located, which is captured by a common agency framework.
The MNE invests K1 in country 1 and K2 in country 2, yielding global profits (before
taxes) Π(K1,K2, θ), where θ is an eﬃciency parameter.3 Investments are substitutes:
∂2Π
∂K1∂K2
(K1,K2, θ) < 0
There are various reasons for assuming substitutability. First, there may be interaction
eﬀects in terms of joint costs, i.e. global profits may be of the form Π(K1,K2, θ) =
N1(K1, θ)+N2(K2, θ)−C(K1+K2) where C(K1+K2) denotes joint costs, and Ni(Ki, θ)
denotes operating profits for the aﬃliate in country i. Convex costs imply economic
2Alternatively, the model can be interpreted as describing multi-principal regulation of an internation-
ally mobile industry with a continuum of small firms with diﬀerent eﬃciency types for investments in the
two countries and with diﬀerent extent of local spillovers.
3 In addition there may be sunk investments in both countries.
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interaction eﬀects between the two aﬃliates; an increase in investments in one of the
countries implies higher marginal joint costs, and thus lower marginal (global) profits from
investments in the other country. These joint costs may have diﬀerent interpretations.
First, K = K1 + K2 may represent scarce human capital, e.g. management resources
or technical personnel, where we assume that the MNE faces convex recruitment and
training costs. Second, K may represent real investments, where C(K) are management
and monitoring costs of the MNE. Economic management and coordination often become
more demanding as the scale of international operations increase, i.e. C(K) is likely to
be convex. Finally, instead of — or in addition to — interaction eﬀects from joint costs,
there may in the case of imperfect competition be interaction eﬀects in terms of market
power. For example, if the two aﬃliates sell their output on the same market (e.g. in a
third country), their activities are substitutes: high investments (and output) in aﬃliate
1 reduce the price obtained by aﬃliate 2.
The countries compete to attract scarce real investments from the MNE, and design
their respective tax systems with a view to this competitive situation. The aﬃliates of the
MNE are separate and independent entities, which means that they are subsidiaries and
thus taxed at source. Letting r1 and r2 denote, respectively, the taxes paid to the two
countries, the post-tax global profits of the firm are given by
π = Π− r1 − r2. (1)
The firm has private information about θ. It is presumed that if the firm is eﬃcient in
one country it is also an eﬃcient operator in the other country. The eﬃciency type is
distributed on
£
θ, θ¯
¤
according to the cumulative distribution function F (θ), with density
f(θ) > 0, where θ denotes the least and θ¯ the most eﬃcient type. The probability distrib-
ution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition.4 Eﬃcient types have higher operating
profits than less eﬃcient types, both on average and at the margin: ∂Π
∂θ
> 0 and ∂
2Π
∂θ∂Kj
> 0,
j = 1, 2. The joint return function has suﬃciently decreasing marginal returns on capital
so that it is optimal for the firm to invest in both countries.
The firm’s investments contribute some positive spillovers/externalities E˜j(Kj , θ) to
each country. The magnitudes of these externalities are known by the firm, but not by the
authorities. These are also assumed to be positively correlated with the firm’s productivity;
4This condition is satisfied by most usual probability distributions, e.g., the normal, uniform, logistic
and exponential distributions.
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so ∂E˜j(Kj, θ)/∂θ > 0.
The MNE and the governments are risk neutral. For all eﬃciency types the aﬃliate’s
net operating profits in each country are suﬃciently high so that both governments always
want to induce the domestic aﬃliate to make some investments in their home country.
Domestic consumer surpluses in the two countries are unaﬀected by changes in the MNE’s
production level, since the firm is assumed to be a price taker (or its market is outside the
two countries). The governments have utilitarian objective functions: the social domestic
welfare generated by an MNE of eﬃciency type θ is given by a weighted sum of the
domestic taxes paid by the firm, the positive spillovers it generates (for other domestic
firms), and the MNE’s global profits:
Wj = (1 + λj)rj + E˜j(Kj , θ) + αjπ, j = 1, 2,
where λj is the general equilibrium shadow cost of public funds in country j, and αj is the
owner share of country j in the MNE.5 We have λj > 0, j = 1, 2, since marginal public
expenditure is financed by distortive taxes. By inserting for Eq.(1), the social welfare
function for country 1 can be restated as
W1 = (1 + λ1) (Π(K1,K2, θ)− r2 +E1(K1, θ))− (1 + λ1 − α1)π, (2)
where Ej(Kj, θ) = 11+λ1 E˜j(Kj, θ). The social welfare consists of two terms. The first
term is domestic social welfare under commonly known information, i.e. the welfare we
would get if the government were able to tax away all the residual income of the MNE.
The government’s revenue is in this case given by the MNE’s net operating profits minus
foreign source tax, plus the ”adjusted” value of spillovers, and multiplied by (1 + λ1) to
obtain a welfare measure. The second term of the welfare function corrects for the loss
of social welfare that stems from private information, i.e. the welfare loss to the country
caused by the MNE keeping parts of the rent. The loss caused by imperfect rent extraction
is equal to the MNE’s global rent multiplied by the diﬀerence between the welfare weights
for income accruing to the MNE and the national government. The social welfare function
for country 2 is analogous. Assuming that λ1 = λ2 = λ,
W = (1 + λ) (Π(K1,K2, θ) +E1(K1, θ) +E2(K2, θ))− (1 + λ− α1 − α2)π (3)
5The shadow cost of public funds is taken as exogenously given in our partial analysis. It can be
endogenised by a general equilibrium model, without aﬀecting the qualitative results. See Laﬀont and
Tirole (1993), chapter 4.
5
is the cooperative welfare function.
Inserting π(θ) = 0 in (3) and maximising with respect to. K1 and K2, we obtain the
first-best global allocation, given by ∂Π
∂K1
+ ∂E1
∂K1
= ∂Π
∂K2
+ ∂E2
∂K2
= 0. This allocation is obtained
in the case of cooperating principals and commonly known information. The solution can
be attained by imposing type-dependent taxes that correct for the externalites and at the
same time extract the firm’s rents.
3 The second-best cooperative equilibrium
When the agent possesses private information and the principals cooperate, they seek to
maximise the joint welfare given by Eq.(3), subject to incentive and participation con-
straints. The participation constraints make sure that the firm finds investments in the
two countries profitable, compared to investment opportunities in other countries. The
incentive constraints stem form the fact that the company has private information, making
it diﬃcult for the governments to ascertain the true tax potential. A firm of type θ can,
by mimicking a less eﬃcient type θ − dθ, obtain profits dπ = ∂Π
∂θ
dθ, so the tax scheme
must allow for such profits (rents). Incentive compatibility thus requires
π0(θ) =
∂Π(K1(θ),K2(θ), θ)
∂θ
. (4)
It can be shown that suﬃcient conditions for incentive compatibility are that dKj(θ)/dθ >
0, j = 1, 2. We see from Eq.(4) that the firm’s rent is increasing in θ, i.e. to be willing
to self-select, eﬃcient types must be rewarded with a higher rent than ineﬃcient types.
Maximizing joint welfare subject to (4) yields the following equations for the optimal
investment portfolio:6
∂Ej(Kj , θ)
∂Kj
+
∂Π(K1,K2, θ)
∂Kj
=
1 + λ− α1 − α2
1 + λ
∂2Π(K1,K2, θ)
∂θ∂Kj
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, j = 1, 2. (5)
To interpret these conditions, note that a tax change that induces an investment change
dKj for type θ will aﬀect its rents by ∂
2Π
∂Kj∂θ
dθdKj , having welfare weight 1+λ−α1−α2.
To preserve incentive compatibility, the same rent diﬀerential must be given to all better
types, i.e. to a fraction 1 − F (θ) of all types. This rent is costly, and must be weighted
against the eﬃciency gain, which from (2) is given by (1 + λ)( ∂Ej
∂Kj
+ ∂Π
∂Kj
)dKjf(θ)dθ. It
follows that (5) expresses an optimal trade-oﬀ for investment Kj.
6For a techical survey of single-principal regulation theory, see Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984).
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Compared with the first-best global optimum, the presence of private information gen-
erates the additional right hand sides of (5), which represent marginal information costs.
The investment portfolios are distorted in order to enhance the governments’ rent extrac-
tion from the MNE, which enables the government to reduce distortive taxes elsewhere in
the economy. The distortions entail reductions of investment levels in both countries for all
types except the most eﬃcient one. At the same time, distortions of the capital allocation
decision of the firm implies that the tax base is reduced. The investment portfolios are
distorted to the point where the marginal deadweight loss equals the marginal deadweight
losses in other sectors of the economy.
The optimal solution in (5) can, under relatively mild conditions, be implemented by
a tax schedule R(K1,K2) where total tax payments depend only on realized investments.
(See e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (1986, 1993)).7 As a second-best response to private informa-
tion, the optimal policy deviates from a level playing field (tax neutrality). The flexibility
imposed by diﬀerential tax enforcement enables the governments to raise welfare, relative
to what is obtained with a common proportional eﬀective tax rate. The induced invest-
ment distortions improve the governments’ ability to capture rent by reducing the firm’s
incentives to exploit its information advantage.
4 The second-best non-cooperative equilibrium
Consider now the case where the governments of the two countries do not cooperate, but
rather compete to attract the firm’s investments. In this case the MNE relates to each
government separately. The governments cannot credibly share information and they act
non-cooperatively, i.e. we seek perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria. We will focus on the
regulatory problem of country 1; the decision problem of country 2 is analogous. Country 1
seeks to maximise expected domestic welfare, subject to incentive compatibility constraints
and participation constraints for the firm; given the strategy of country 2. In this setting it
is natural to assume that each country oﬀers a tax schedule, eﬀectively specifying the firm’s
tax obligation to that country as function of its investments in the country.8 So we are
7 In general, this will require a tax function that is not additive separable. To implement the cooperative
solution taxes must thus in general be coordinated such that the marginal tax in one country depends on
investments in both countries.
8We assume that domestic investment is the key observable variable to each government.
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looking for an equilibrium in tax schedules (or menus) R1(K1), R2(K2).9 To interpret these
tax schedules, we can envision the countries keeping the statutory corporate income tax
rates fixed, and oﬀering non-linear depreciation schedules and tax exemptions to attract
investments from the MNE. In designing a non-linear corporate income tax scheme for
internationally mobile firms, country 1 takes the depreciation schedules of country 2 as
given. However, country 1 must take into account that its choice of strategy (tax schedule)
may cause investment externalities: a change in the contract of country 1 may aﬀect the
agent’s investment in country 2, i.e. the agent’s choice of K1 may aﬀect its investment
K2, and thereby make it deviate from the investment level intended for it by country 2.
Similar considerations apply for the latter country. A constraint on equilibrium contracts
is imposed by the following feasible strategies: to capture a larger fraction of the MNE’s
rent, each country will attempt to induce the MNE to deviate from the investment level
intended for it by the other country. In equilibrium, however, all contracts are incentive
compatible.
4.1 Equilibrium investments and taxes.
Country 1 takes the tax function oﬀered by country 2 as given, and realizes that the firm’s
investments K2(θ) in that country satisfy
∂Π
∂K2
(K1(θ),K2(θ), θ)−R02(K2(θ)) = 0. (6)
Incentive compatibility requires that (4) must hold for equilibrium profits in this non-
cooperative case as well. The decision problem of country 1 can now be seen as maximizing
domestic welfare subject to the constraints (4), (6) and π(θ) ≥ 0.10 That is, the regulatory
problem is similar to the cooperative case, with an additional restriction. Following a
procedure similar to Martimort (1992, 1996a) - see the Appendix - one can see that,
if the system of diﬀerential equations below defines a pair of nondecreasing investment
schedules {K1(θ),K2(θ)}, and those schedules in addition satisfy a set of implementability
9The Revelation Principle (in its usual form) is not generally valid for common agency, so there may
exist equilibria in more general message spaces that can not be replicated as an equilibrium in direct
revelation mechanisms (Martimort and Stole 1997, Peters 1999). The restriction to tax schedules seems
reasonable in the current application.
10The constraint (4) is only the first-order condition for the firm’s optimal choice of report. Under
additional conditions (common implementability conditions) one can check ex post that the first-order
condition is suﬃcient for optimality.
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conditions, they constitute a pure-strategy diﬀerentiable Nash equilibrium outcome for the
common agency game11:
∂Ej
∂Kj
+
∂Π
∂Kj
=
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ

 ∂
2Π
∂θ∂Kj
+
∂2Π
∂θ∂Ki
∂2Π
∂Ki∂Kj
K0i(θ)
∂2Π
∂θ∂Ki
+ ∂
2Π
∂Ki∂Kj
K 0j(θ)

 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, j = 1, 2.
(7)
Note that with full information the first best is attained, so the strategic eﬀects intro-
duced are arising form the presence of private information and not from the technology
assumptions. To interpret and understand (7), we present here a heuristic derivation of
this equilibrium condition. Country 1 takes the other country’s tax schedule as given, and
recognises that the firm chooses foreign investments K2, conditional on domestic invest-
ments K1 in accordance with (6). A change in domestic taxes that induces a marginal
change in domestic investments will then induce a change in foreign investments given by
dK2
dK1
= −Π12Π22−R002
, where Πij denote second-order partials. Such a change for type θ will thus
aﬀect this type’s rent diﬀerential (∂Π
∂θ
dθ) by
dπ =
·
∂2Π
∂θ∂K1
+
∂2Π
∂θ∂K2
dK2
dK1
¸
dθ. (8)
The same rent diﬀerential must be given to a fraction 1 − F (θ) of all types. This is
costly, and must be weighted against the eﬃciency gain, which from (2)-(6) is given by
(1 + λ)( ∂E1
∂K1
+ ∂Π
∂K1
)f(θ)dθ. It follows that (7) expresses an optimal trade-oﬀ for country
1 (for j = 1, i = 2), provided that the last term in the square brackets is an adequate
representation of the investment response dK2dK1 =
−Π12
Π22−R002
. To see that this is the case, note
that (6) must hold for all types in equilibrium, and by diﬀerentiation of this relation with
respect to θ we see that −Π12Π22−R002
=
Π12K02
Π2θ+Π12K01
holds in equilibrium. Hence, (7) is a pair of
equilibrium conditions for the investment allocations that follow from the two countries’
strategic choice of tax schedules.
To characterize the equilibrium tax functions, note that (6) holds for each type θ. Let
θj(Kj) be the type that invests Kj in country j in equilibrium; i.e. θj() is the inverse
of the equilibrium investment schedule Kj(θ); assuming that the latter is invertible (e.g.
11We get the result, traditional for common agency models, that the total tax payments of the MNE are
uniquely determined in equilibrium, but not the distribution between the two countries. The latter would
be determined outside the model by a bargaining game between the two governments, and will not aﬀect
the results of the model.
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strictly increasing). Substituting θ = θj(Kj) in (6) then implies
R0j(Kj) =
∂Π
∂Kj
(Kj,Ki(θj(Kj)), θj(Kj)). (9)
This relation determines marginal tax rates for all investment levels that can be realized
in equilibrium. Note that the tax schedule for an individual country must, for a given
tax system in the other country, balance two concerns: (i) to induce production eﬃciency
and (ii) to extract rents from the firm. The first calls for negative tax rates (subsidies)
to correct for external spillovers from the firm, the second for positive tax rates to reduce
investments and thereby facilitate rent extraction by relaxing the incentive constraints.
The equilibrium conditions (7) show that there are no distortions from the first-best ’at
the top’ (for type θ¯). It follows that the marginal tax rates given by (9) are negative for
investments near K¯j = Kj(θ¯); in fact we have R0j(K¯j) =
∂Π
∂Kj
(K¯j , K¯i, θ¯) = − ∂Ej∂Kj (K¯j , θ¯).
These marginal subsidies induce an eﬃcient firm — which by assumption also generates
high spillovers — to increase its investments beyond what would otherwise have been pri-
vately optimal. The concern to induce production eﬃciency thus dominates for such ’high’
investments. In order to extract rents from the firm, less eﬃcient types should be induced
to invest less, and marginal taxes may for that reason be positive for lower investment
levels Kj.
4.2 Tax competition vs. tax harmonization.
What would be the eﬀect of a tax harmonization between the two countries? Comparing
the cooperative and the non-cooperative investment solutions, given by Eqs. (5) and (7),
respectively, we see that the latter contains an additional term, which accounts for the
interaction eﬀect of common agency. This term is negative,12 and represents a second-
order rent eﬀect which calls for increasing domestic investments. By imposing taxes that
induce an increase in the MNE’s domestic investments, the government of country j can
cause investments to fall in country i (we have dKidKj < 0), which has the eﬀect, ceteris
paribus, of increasing the tax revenue of country j (a fiscal externality).
Apart from diﬀerences due to the strategic (fiscal) eﬀect, the cooperative and non-
cooperative solutions also diﬀer because in the latter case neither of the governments
internalise the profits that accrue to investors in the other country (equity externalities).
12The numerator is positive and we know from the necessary second-order conditions for common im-
plementability that the denominator is negative.
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For this reason the motive to extract rents is always stronger in the non-cooperative
case. This is reflected in the diﬀerent weights that appear on the right-hand sides of
equations (5) and (7); 1+λ−αj > 1+λ−αj −αi. The equity externalities lead to more
aggressive rent collection by the governments, which implies more severe distortions, i.e.
lower investments than in the cooperative case. Note that lower investments imply lower
profits (rents) for the firm, see (4), and hence that tax competition may harm the firm if
the equity eﬀect dominates. These considerations can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 When two countries compete to attract a large share of an MNE’s invest-
ment budget, and when there is private information about net operating profits, eﬃciency
and external spillovers, the distortion of the investment portfolio is in equilibrium deter-
mined by a trade-oﬀ between a first-order (conventional) and a second-order (strategic in-
teraction) rent eﬀect. Compared with the cooperative solution, strategic interaction among
governments introduces fiscal externalities and equity externalities, having opposite eﬀects
on investment levels. Hence, it cannot be generally determined whether tax harmonization
leads to higher or lower investments and profits for the firm.
The strategic eﬀected associated with common agency is well known, see e.g. Stole
(1992). An eﬀect somewhat similar to the equity externality can be found in Martimort
(1996b), where multiple regulators have biased objectives favoring an interest group. The
externality eﬀects are diﬀerent, however, since the decisions considered there are comple-
ments, while ours are substitutes. Our model and results are also diﬀerent by focusing
on spillover eﬀects - subject to private information - and asymmetric equilibria. This is
further commented below. Equity eﬀects are in part determined by owner shares, and in
Olsen and Osmundsen (1999a) it is analysed how the distribution of ownership between
residents of diﬀerent countries aﬀects the symmetric tax policy equilibrium, and what
distribution yields the most favorable equilibrium outcome. The present analysis extends
that paper by introducing spillovers, and focuses mainly on a diﬀerent issue, namely on
how the firm’s information about such spillovers, and in particular asymmetric spillovers,
aﬀects the relative merits of competitive and cooperative tax regimes. We also extend the
analysis of optimal ownership to a setting with externalities and asymmetric equilibria.
To develop some intuition for how spillovers aﬀect the tax equilibrium, it is instructive
to take the first-best investment allocation as a starting point, and consider the gov-
ernments’ incentives to deviate from this allocation. We consider first the case of fully
11
symmetric countries, i.e., symmetric technologies and owner shares.
Symmetric countries. First note that in order to implement first-best investments,
each country’s tax function must satisfy −R0(K(θ)) = ∂E
∂K (K(θ), θ), where subscripts
are subsumed due to symmetry. Marginal taxes must be negative and equal to marginal
spillover eﬀects in magnitude, and this must hold for every type θ. It follows that the slope
of each marginal tax schedule must satisfy −R00 = E11 + E1θ 1K0(θ) , where subscripts here
denote partials, andK0(θ) can be found from the conditions defining first-best investments.
This yields
−R00 = E11 +
E1θ
E1θ +Π1θ
(−E11 −Π11 −Π12) (10)
Assuming a concave total surplus (so E11 +Π11 ≤ 0), we see that −R00 > 0; i.e. the mar-
ginal tax schedule, R0(K), slopes downward (marginal subsidy schedule slopes upward),
unless spillovers are strongly convex. For concreteness we consider this case. Marginal
subsidies are then larger for larger investment levels, and this is necessary to induce better
types to invest suﬃciently more than less eﬃcient types. Note that as marginal spillovers
become more strongly dependent on type—i.e. as E1θ gets bigger—the marginal subsidy
schedule becomes steeper; marginal subsidies must then increase more rapidly with in-
vestments in order to induce bigger investment diﬀerences between types.
Now consider one country’s incentive to deviate from the tax functions that implement
first-best investments. A move on the part of country 1 to marginally reduce domestic
investments will give rise to a benefit (rents extracted from the firm) that is proportional to
Π1θ[1+
dK2
dK1
]. The firm’s strategic investment response is determined by (6), and it follows
from this relation that the response is stronger, the steeper is the marginal tax schedule
in country 2. This implies that as marginal spillovers become more strongly dependent on
type—i.e. as E1θ gets bigger—the firm’s (negative) investment response becomes stronger,
and the country’s incentive to deviate in turn becomes weaker.
This reasoning indicates that stronger spillover eﬀects (bigger E1θ) leads in the sym-
metric case to weaker incentives for each country to deviate from first-best investments.
By a direct calculation we see that there is an incentive to deviate as long as
2Π12
E11 +Π11 +Π12
<
Π1θ
E1θ +Π1θ
(11)
The left-hand side of the inequality is a measure of substitutability between investments in
the two countries; the ratio is zero for independent investments (Π12 = 0), it is equal to 1
for perfect substitutes (E11+Π11 = Π12), and it is generally between 0 and 1 for less than
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perfect substitutes. For suﬃciently strong substitutes, or for a suﬃciently strong spillover
eﬀect E1θ, the inequality becomes an equality, and neither country has then any incentive
to deviate from the first-best.13 Any induced distortion dKi of domestic investments will
then be met by the firm by an oﬀsetting change of foreign investments (dKj = −dKi),
and this will leave the firm’s rents unaltered. These considerations indicate that in such
limiting cases no distortions from first-best investments will take place in equilibrium.
If on the other hand the countries cooperate and harmonize their tax policies, there
is no strategic eﬀect and the countries then do have an incentive to reduce investments in
order to capture rents. Comparing investments under the two tax regimes, we should thus
expect that investments are lower under tax coordination compared to tax competition when
spillovers are strongly dependent on types, and/or when investments are close substitutes
across countries. This is confirmed by the formal analysis of a parametric specification
in Section 5. That analysis also shows that the converse relation holds when spillovers
are weak and/or investments are not close substitutes. In the latter case tax competition
leads to lower investments than tax coordination; the equity eﬀect then dominates the
fiscal (strategic) eﬀect.14
It is worth noting that the firm’s information regarding external spillovers (E1θ) and
its information regarding internal profits (Π1θ) aﬀect the countries’ tax policies, and hence
the non-cooperative equilibrium, in very diﬀerent ways. The former weakens each coun-
try’s incentive to deviate from the first-best, the latter strengthens these incentives. The
strengthening of incentives to deviate works through two channels; first through the con-
ventional rent extraction eﬀect—just as in the cooperative case—and secondly through a
weakening of the strategic eﬀect. The strategic eﬀect is weakened because a stronger
dependence of profits on information—a larger Π1θ—reduces the slope of the marginal tax
(subsidy) schedules that support the initial (first-best) allocation (see 10), and this reduc-
tion weakens the firm’s investment response. The opposing eﬀects of information regarding
external spillovers and internal profits are confirmed by the formal analysis in Section 5.
Asymmetric spillovers. Consider now the case of asymmetric spillovers, and to
13One can check that the weak version of the inequality is a necessary condition for local concavity of
the firm’s after-tax profit function, i.e. for implementability. If this condition should not hold, it will not
be possible to implement the first-best by a pair of diﬀerentiable tax functions that depend only on the
respective investments in the two countries. We will only consider cases where the condition does hold.
14This is obviously true in the extreme case where investments are completely independent; Π12 = 0,
since the strategic eﬀect then vanishes.
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consider a strong form of asymmetry, suppose there are spillovers in only one country, say
country 1 (so E2(K2, θ) = 0). The countries are otherwise symmetric. Consider again
the governments’ incentives to deviate from first-best investments. In this case, the tax
functions that implement the first-best satisfy R02(K2) = 0 and −R01(K1) = ∂E1∂K1 (K1, θ).
The marginal tax schedule is flat (zero) in country 2, and it is downward sloping in country
1. Recall that the strategic investment eﬀect for country 1 depends on the slope of the
marginal tax schedule in country 2, and vice versa, and that the eﬀect is stronger, the
steeper is the relevant marginal tax schedule. From the relative slopes of these schedules
it now follows that the (negative) strategic eﬀect for country 1 is weaker than that for
country 2.15 A weak strategic eﬀect implies a strong incentive to deviate: the rent that
can be extracted by a marginal deviation is proportional to 1 + dK2dK1 . So country 1 has a
stronger incentive to deviate from the first-best than has country 2. A profitable deviation
entails taxes that reduce investments for low-eﬃciency types; hence the tax schedule in
country 1 must be made even steeper than it was initially.
These considerations indicate that there may be a tendency for country 1—where
spillovers are present—to implement a steep marginal tax schedule, eﬀectively taxing low-
eﬃciency firms and subsidizing high-eﬃciency ones, and for country 2 to implement a
relatively flat and low-level marginal tax schedule. Such a tax configuration can be an
equilibrium because it induces a relatively much stronger strategic eﬀect in country 2
than in country 1. The low marginal taxes in country 2 is an optimal response when
the strategic eﬀect is strong. The steep marginal tax schedule in country 1 is an optimal
response when the strategic eﬀect is weak. Together the two schedules thus constitute an
equilibrium.16
In Section 5 we demonstrate, for a parametric specification of the model, that such
equilibria obtain for a range of parameters. Note the implications for investments. In
country 1 any type of firm (except the very best one) is subsidized less at the margin—and
15The firm’s before-tax profits are symmetric between countries. It is the diﬀerentiated tax treatments—
positive subsidies in country 1, zero subsidies in country 2—that generate the firm’s asymmetric response
pattern.
16Something similar can occur if spillovers are symmetric, but operating profits depend asymmetrically
on the firm’s type, e.g. Π1θ > Π2θ . Other things equal, a given investment distortion will then enable more
rents to be extracted in country 1 than in country 2. The equilibrium may thus entail a steeper marginal
tax schedule in country 1 (to induce larger distortions there) than in country 2. Parametric examples
exhibiting these features can be constructed.
14
some types considerably less—than under the scheme implementing first-best investments.
Moreover, any type of firm is only slightly taxed at the margin in country 2. The firm
therefore invests less in country 1. This makes investments in country 2 relatively more
attractive, and since it is taxed only slightly there, investments in country 2 may increase
relative to first-best investments. This explains why there may be overinvestments relative
to first-best investments in the country with no spillovers, and underinvestments in the
other country. Since the cooperative solution—due to the absence of strategic eﬀects—
always entails lower investments in both countries compared to the first-best, it then
follows that there is overinvestments in the country with no spillovers also compared to
the cooperative solution. In such cases tax competition thus leads to misallocations—relative
to a cooperative solution—in the form of investments not being suﬃciently concentrated
in the country where they would generate the largest spillovers. This is analysed more
precisely in Section 5. First we discuss related literature.
4.3 Related literature
Our model features contract substitutes and national principals that, due to equity consid-
erations rationally assign only partial weights to the firm’s rents (parts of the rents accrue
to foreign investors). The equity externalities counteract the tendency to overinvestment
that otherwise arise from strategic considerations. A similar eﬀect is present in a model
by Martimort (1996b), which has (perfect) contract complements and principals that put
excessive weights on the firm’s rents due to favoritism. The counteracting tendencies of
insuﬃcient (excessive) profit weights and strategic eﬀects due to contract substitutes (com-
plements) are similar in the two models, but their foci are very diﬀerent. The main point
in Martimort’s paper is to show that sharing powers between non-benevolent regulators
may be socially better than entrusting all regulatory powers to only one of them. We focus
on the relations and relative influences of symmetric as well as asymmetric spillover eﬀects,
owner shares and the firm’s substitution possibilities. These issues are not discussed in
Martimort’s paper.
We emphasize private information about spillover eﬀects and productivity, i.e. we
do not specifically address the issues of intra-firm trade and transfer pricing. For an
analysis of transfer pricing regulation see, e.g. Bond and Gresik (1996).17 In that article
17A home and a host country use trade taxes to regulate an MNE which has private information about
the cost of an intermediate good that is sold from the parent to a subsidiary in the host country.
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the competing governments control complementary activities, whereas in our model the
relevant activities are substitutes. Our economic focus is diﬀerent, and by addressing the
issues of spillover eﬀects and externalities, our analytical perspective is diﬀerent. We also
get diﬀerent qualitative results. Bond and Gresik find that under private information the
firm’s activity level and information rents always are lower when the principals compete
than when they cooperate, and that the activity level always is highest in the first-best
case. We find that the activity level (investments) and rents under competition may be
either higher or lower than under cooperation. We also show that the activity level under
common agency may even exceed the first-best level in one country.
Our model is in some respects an extension of Osmundsen, Hagen and Schjelderup
(1998); a partial model where a single principal regulates a continuum of mobile firms that
have private information about their mobility costs. That analysis presumes a passive
foreign government, which may be unrealistic since it implies a transfer of tax revenue
from the foreign country to the home country. We extend the model to take into account
strategic interaction between the governments, and by accounting for externalities.
Our model is also related to Laussel and Lebreton (1995), who analyse taxation of a
large investor which possesses an exogenous amount of capital that it may allocate in two
locations.18 We extend this analysis by allowing for spillover eﬀects and national owner-
ship, which aﬀects the qualitative results by introducing equity externalities. Moreover, in
our model the level of capital is endogenous, and whereas the firm has private information
about the amount of capital it possesses in Laussel and Lebreton, we focus on private
information about spillover eﬀects and eﬃciency.19
A diﬀerent, yet related multiprincipal regulatory problem is analysed by Mezzetti
(1997), who considers a case where an agent has private information about his relative
productivity in the tasks he performs for two principals. In contrast, our focus is on
private information about the absolute eﬃciency level. Also, we introduce spillover eﬀects.
Another diﬀerence is that we address a case of substitutes, whereas in Mezzetti’s model
18A similar setup is found in Haaparanta (1996), but under perfect information. Haaparanta analyses a
subsidy game where two governments, maximising the net wage income, compete to attract investments
of a single firm.
19Our model is also somewhat related to Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993), in which two principals competes
for the exclusive services of an agent that has private information about his or her eﬀort and productiv-
ity. Whereas we focus on a multinational enterprise that divides its activities between several countries,
Biglaiser and Mezzetti analyse a case where a worker must work full time for a single company.
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there is complementarity between the agent’s tasks. The results also diﬀer in important
ways. Whereas Mezzetti finds that the agent’s information rent is always higher under tax
competition than under cooperation, we find that the rent may be lower in come cases.
Moreover, Mezzetti’s model exhibits countervailing incentives; this is not the case in our
model.20
5 A parametric specification
By assuming specific functions, explicit regulatory mechanisms may be derived. We solve
for the case of quadratic/linear functions and a uniform distribution. We further assume
here that the firm’s private investment returns are symmetric between the two countries.
The specific functional forms are:
Ej(Kj , θ) = ejθKj
Π(K1,K2, θ) = (mθ + k)ΣjKj − 12qΣjK
2
j − 12a(K1 +K2)
2, with m, k, q, a > 0; and
f(θ) = 1, θ ∈ [0, 1] .
For the first-best allocation we get two equations; ∂Π
∂Kj
+
∂Ej
∂Kj = 0, j = 1, 2, which yield the
solutions
KjF (θ) =
(m+ ej) (q + a)− (m+ ei) a
(q + a)2 − a2 θ +
kq
(q + a)2 − a2 ≡ K
0
jF · θ + LjF , (12)
where the identity defines the slope (K 0jF ) and intercept (LjF ) of this linear relation. We
assume (m+ ej) (q+a)−(m+ ei) a > 0, i, j = 1, 2, implying that the first-best investment
levels are increasing in θ in both countries.
The cooperative solution as given by Eq. (5) also yields investment levels that are linear
in θ; specifically KjC(θ) = K0jC · θ+LjC , where K 0jC = K 0jF +γ mq(q+a)2−a2 , γ = 1+λ−α1−α21+λ ,
and LjC is such that there is no distortion from the first-best allocation for the best type
(θ = 1). We see that the cooperative investment schedule in each country is steeper than
the corresponding first—best schedule (K 0jC > K
0
jF ). Hence there is underinvestment in
both countries relative to first-best investment levels.
20 In Olsen and Osmundsen (1999b) we extend the present model (in absence of spillover eﬀects) to
include an outside option, and this option is also seen to generate countervailing incentives; i.e. incentive
constraints bind ’upwards’ as well as ’downwards’ on the type interval. The diﬀerent information structures
in the two models have quite diﬀerent implications, though; whereas Mezzetti obtains equilibria that are
unique and exhibit pooling for a range of intermediate types, we obtain non-unique and fully separating
equilibria.
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The equations that define the non-cooperative (common agency) equilibrium in this
parametric model also have linear solutions Kj(θ) = Lj +K 0j · θ, j = 1, 2. By insertion
one can derive a pair of equations for the slope parameters (K0j), see the appendix.21 In
order to qualify as a common-agency equilibrium, the linear solutions must in addition be
commonly implementable (see the appendix).
The equilibrium non-cooperative tax schedules can then be derived explicitly from (9).
Marginal tax rates are seen to be positive for low investments, and decreasing with in-
creasing investments in equilibrium. For the investment levels chosen by the most eﬃcient
type of firm, the marginal investment tax is negative (a subsidy) and equal in magnitude
to the marginal spillover eﬀect for this type in both countries.
5.1 The fully symmetric case
We solve now for the fully symmetric case, where in addition to the assumptions above we
assume symmetric externality eﬀects (e1 = e2 = e) and symmetric owner shares: α1 = α2.
The first-best allocation is then symmetric between countries, and we see that investments
are higher, the stronger are the spillovers. The cooperative solution also yields investment
levels that are symmetric, and we know from the previous section that this solution yields
underinvestment in both countries.
For the non-cooperative case, the equilibrium solutions Kj(θ) = K 0j · θ + Lj , j = 1, 2,
are symmetric and can be found explicitly, see the appendix. In order that the solution be
commonly implementable, it is necessary and suﬃcient that K 0j satisfies 0 ≤ 2 amK
0
j ≤ 1.
Straightforward algebra shows that this amounts to em ≤
q
2a .
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Comparing the first-best and the common agency investment schedules we find that
here is underinvestment in common agency (relative to FB) when em <
q
2a , and that
equilibrium investments approach first-best investments when em →
q
2a . This accords with
the intuition developed in Section 4.2. Based on the absence of strategic eﬀects in the
coordinated case, it was there further argued that tax coordination should be expected
to yield lower investments than tax competition when spillover eﬀects are strong and/or
investments are close substitutes across countries (i.e. when q2a −
e
m is small in the present
parametric model). Using the explicit solutions to the model we can confirm that this is
21The intercept parameters (Lj) can be determined by the condition that there should be no distortions
for the best type (θ = 1).
22This condition is equivalent to (the weak version of) condition (11) above, since q
a
= Π12Π11 − 1.
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the case (see the appendix):
Proposition 2 In the symmetric uniform-quadratic case, both tax competition (common
agency) and tax coordination (single agency) induce underinvestment relative to first-best
investments. There is lower investment — and hence lower profits for the firm — under
competition than under coordination if spillovers are small, investments are not too close
substitutes, the cost of public funds is small, and/or domestic owner shares are large; more
precisely if and only if qa + 4 >
1+λ
α1
( em + 2). Otherwise, i.e. for larger spillovers, invest-
ments that are closer substitutes, a larger cost of public funds and/or smaller domestic
owner shares, there is higher investment under tax competition than under tax coordina-
tion. As spillovers become suﬃciently large (as em →
1
2
q
a), the competitive equilibrium
investment levels become equal to first-best investments.
Going from a competitive to a coordinated tax setting, two types of externalities are
internalized. First, fiscal externalities are adjusted for, so each of the countries will not
try to expand its tax base at the expense of the other. Coordination in this respect
thus calls for higher marginal taxes, lower investments and lower profits. Second, the
coordinated governments account for the dividends to shareholders in both countries,
i.e. equity externalities are internalized. This implies a higher welfare weight for the
MNEs profits (a lower motive to capture rent), and higher investment levels and profits.
Thus, the two eﬀects go in diﬀerent directions. We are able, however, to tell under what
conditions which of the eﬀects will be dominating. For given technology we see that there
is underinvestment — and hence lower profits for the firm — under tax competition than
under tax coordination when the domestic owner share (α1) is high, i.e. international cross-
ownership is to the benefit of the firm.23 High domestic owner shares imply weak equity
externalities, and this tends to yield lower investments and profits under competition than
under coordination. This result deviates from the tax competition literature that presumes
kommonly known information, where the firm (agent) benefits from competition between
principals.
Other things equal, smaller spillovers will generate underinvestment in the competi-
tive tax regime. Lower spillovers reduce investments both under competition and under
23Note that the symmetry assumptions imply α1 ≤ 12 and thus
1+λ
α1 ≥ 2. For α1 =
1
2
and λ = 0 the
condition for underinvestment reduces to q
a
≥ 2 e
m
, which is the condition for implementability. Thus, for
a feasible technology the condition for underinvestment in the proposition is satisfied if α1 is high and λ
is low.
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coordination, but more so in the former case. The reason for this is that lower spillovers
reduce the strategic eﬀect, and as this eﬀect becomes weaker, equilibrium investments are
reduced.
For larger spillovers there will be higher investments and higher profits under tax com-
petition than under tax cooperation. Larger spillovers intensify the competition to attract
valuable investments, leading to overinvestments relative to the cooperative solution. A
technology that allows for easier substitution of investments between the two countries
(i.e. where qa +1 =
Π11
Π12 is small) will also lead to higher investments (smaller distortions)
under competition relative to coordination.
Both regimes yield investments below the first-best levels, but in the limit, as spillovers
become suﬃciently large ( em →
1
2
q
a), the competitive equilibrium investments become equal
to first-best investments. The latter occurs because in the limit the strategic eﬀects dKidKj
become equal to−1; and for such strong strategic eﬀects there is in equilibrium no incentive
for any country to distort investments away from the first best in order to capture rents.
In this case, investments in the two countries are perfect economic substitutes from the
perspective of the firm, and neither of the countries can unilaterally extract information
rents from the firm.
5.2 Investments under asymmetric spillovers
We consider now the case of asymmetric spillovers. Otherwise the countries are assumed
to be symmetric. An interesting and from a policy viewpoint important issue is whether
competition in such a case will lead to misallocations in the sense of investments becoming
too much spread out, and not properly concentrated in the country where they would
yield the largest spillovers. The model shows that competition does have this eﬀect when
spillovers are suﬃciently asymmetric between countries. At the same time, the analysis
indicates why coordination may be diﬃcult to achieve in this setting: to implement a
coordinated solution one country would have to give away investments that confer positive
spillovers on national firms.
To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that spillovers are non-existent in one country,
here taken to be country 2. So we have e1 > 0, e2 = 0. The firm continues to have private
knowledge about the extent of spillovers in the other country. We first illustrate our results
by a numerical example.
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Example. Suppose q = a = m and e1m =
1
4 , e2 = 0. Then from (12) we find that
the first-best investment schedules satisfy K01F =
1
2 and K
0
2F =
1
4 . Suppose further that
α1
1+λ =
2
5 , so that γ1 =
3
5 . Then we can check (from the equilibrium conditions, see (14)
in the appendix ) that the common-agency schedules satisfy K 01 =
11
18 and K
0
2 =
1
4 . The
assumed parameter values thus yield K 01 > K 01F and K
0
2 = K
0
2F , which tells us that the
corresponding equilibrium entails underinvestment relative to the first-best in country 1,
and exactly first-best investments in country 2. (One can check that a stronger spillover
eﬀect in country 1 would have generated overinvestment in country 2.)
The associated equilibrium marginal tax schedules can be obtained from (9). We get
R01(K1) = m
17
22(K¯1 −K1) −
1
4m and R
0
2(K2) = m
4
9(K¯2 −K2), where K¯1 =
1
2 +
k
3m and
K¯2 =
1
4 +
k
3m are the respective investment levels for the most eﬃcient type of firm. In
country 2, where there are no spillovers, the marginal tax rate is positive, decreasing and
equal to zero for K2 = K¯2. In country 1 the marginal tax rate is also decreasing, it
is further positive for ’small’ investments, but negative (a subsidy) for ’large’ ones. For
K1 = K¯1 the marginal subsidy in country 1 equals the marginal domestic spillover eﬀect.
Given these tax schedules we compute the strategic investment eﬀects from dKjdKi =
−Π12
Πjj−R00j
, and obtain dK2dK1 = −
9
14 ,
dK1
dK2
= −2227 . The latter, applying to country 2, is much
stronger than the former, applying to country 1. Country 1 has therefore a much stronger
incentive than country 2 to distort investments to capture rents. (By a marginal investment
distortion, country 1 can capture rents proportional to m 514 , while country 2 by a similar
domestic operation only can capture m 527 , see (8).) If country 2 imposed zero marginal
taxes, then the tax schedule in country 1 would generate underinvestments (relative to
the first-best) in country 1, and — by a substitution eﬀect on the part of the firm —
overinvestments in country 2. The government of country 2 has a relatively weak incentive
to distort these investments to capture rents. The small distortion, achieved by imposing
positive, but relatively small marginal taxes, reduces investments in country 2 somewhat,
and — for the given parameters — to a level that coincides with what is first-best in that
country. Conversely, given country 2’s tax schedule, country 1 has a relatively strong
incentive to distort domestic investments, and this leads to investments that are lower
than the first-best levels in country 1.
Computing the cooperative investment solution (as given in the paragraph following
(12)), we find K 01C =
17
30 and K
0
2C =
19
60 . We thus have K
0
1 > K
0
1C and K
0
2 < K
0
2F ,
which tells us that the competitive outcome entails underinvestment in country 1 and
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overinvestment in country 2 relative to the cooperative solution.
The example illustrates that competition may — compared to the cooperative solution
— entail too much investments in the country where spillovers are low (here zero, in fact),
and not enough investments in the other, high-spillover country. We will now show that in
this model competition does, for suﬃciently asymmetric spillovers, lead to misallocations
in the form of investments being either excessive in both countries, or excessive in the
country where spillovers are lowest and at the same time insuﬃcient in the country where
spillovers are highest. Moreover, we find that the latter outcome — where investments are
too high in the low-spillover country and too low in the high-spillover country — typically
occurs if substitution is not too easy ( qa is not too small), domestic owner shares are
relatively large and/or the cost of public funds is relatively small. The example above
illustrates such a case.
To state the formal result, define Q = qa + 1 and ε
0
1 =
(Q−1)Q
Q+γ1
. Then we have
Proposition 3 For the uniform-quadratic case the following holds. If the countries have
suﬃciently asymmetric spillovers (E2(K2, θ) ≡ 0 and E1(K1, θ) = e1θK1 with e1 close
to mε01) then non-cooperative investments are higher than cooperative investments in the
country where spillovers are low, while the corresponding investments in the other, high-
spillover country may be lower or higher than the cooperative investments there. They are
lower if substitution is not too easy, domestic owner shares are large and/or the cost of
public funds is small; more precisely if qa > (
1+λ
α
− 1)(1− 2α1+λ)− 1.
The appendix contains the proof, which also shows that competitive investments under
strongly asymmetric spillovers are excessive relative to the first-best standard in the low-
spillover country.
In our model, competition among the countries to attract potentially valuable in-
vestments may thus well result in excessive amounts of investments being made in one
country, and insuﬃcient amounts being made in the other. This result is in contrast with
tax competition models with commonly known information, in which the competition
for attracting real investments invariably causes source taxes to fall and investments to
rise, see, e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). The results also deviate from symmetric
regulation models, such as Laussel and Lebreton (1995).
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5.3 Ownership, profits and welfare.
The last section showed that for highly asymmetric spillovers, but otherwise symmetric
technologies and owner shares, the tax equilibrium tends to entail excessive investments
in the country where spillovers are lowest. Due to the equity externalities the equilibrium
outcome depends on the firm’s ownership structure. This raises the question whether the
firm may have incentives to influence this structure in order to aﬀect the tax equilibrium.
In this section we show that the firm does have such incentives; in particular, for asym-
metric spillovers it is seen that the firm would prefer to have a majority of its owners in
the high-spillover country. Moreover, we investigate whether the ownership configuration
most preferred by the firm is also the one most preferred by the societies at large, and
show that there is in general a conflict of interest between the firm and the governments
with respect to this issue.
A joint venture with a local firm is one example of how a firm may influence the national
distribution of its ownership. The ownership structure is otherwise most easily aﬀected
for non-listed firms. The initial owners may in this case carefully select its investors to
obtain the preferred national distribution of ownership. In the case of a wider dispersion
of owners, a stable ownership structure can be enhanced by initially approaching long
term investors. To promote an advantageous national distribution of shares, the firm may
undertake direct placement of shares among long term investors in the country holding a
too low equity share. As for the governments, the national distribution of equity shares
may be aﬀected by regulations, by personal income tax design, or by direct government
equity acquisitions or sales. With respect to regulations, some countries have imposed
ownership restrictions, e.g. on foreign ownership of financial institutions. More targeted
policies in use are indigenisation requirements, meaning that the host government requires
an investor to share ownership of an aﬃliate with residents in the host country (see Katrak
(1983)).
For a setting with no spillovers and a symmetric technology Olsen and Osmundsen
(1999a) show that a balanced ownership structure is optimal for the firm as well as for the
two host countries. In that setting the balanced structure protects the firm against highly
distortive taxes in the two countries, as local ownership reduces the governments’ motive
for capturing the firm’s rents.24 Here we extend the analysis of ownership to include
24The result has a flavor similar to classical results in the public finance literature, in which convex tax
collection costs make it advantageous to spread distortions over many tax objects.
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spillover eﬀects and asymmetric equilibria. With spillover eﬀects on national firms each
government has an additional motive to attract investments from the MNE. We find that
for asymmetric spillovers the firm prefers an unbalanced ownership distribution, and —
contrary to the symmetric case — the firm and the governments have opposing views on
the optimal ownership pattern.
Note that if the firm is partly owned by investors outside the two countries where it
operates, the two countries’ motives for rent extraction will be stronger than if the firm
has no outside ownership. From the firm’s point of view it is therefore advantageous (with
respect to maximising its rents) to have all its owners inside the two countries. In the
following we consider only this case, i.e., we assume throughout that α1 + α2 = 1.
Recall that the firm’s marginal rents are given by π0(θ) = ∂Π
∂θ
, which equals m(K1 +
K2) for the functional forms assumed here. Suppose now that everything else (including
technology) is fixed, and let the owner shares vary, subject to α1 + α2 = 1. Marginal
rents are then clearly largest when shares are distributed such that the total sum of
investments, K1+K2 is largest. The following result characterizes this outcome. To state
the proposition we define ’normalized’ spillover parameters εi = eim and recall the definition
Q = qa + 1.
Proposition 4 The firm’s equilibrium rents π(θ) under tax competition (common agency)
are for every type largest for owner shares given by
α1 =
1
2
+ h(ε1, ε2,Q,λ), α2 = 1− α1,
where ∂h
∂ε1
> 0, ∂h
∂ε2
< 0 and h() = 0 for ε1 = ε2. The firm’s optimal owner share in
country 1 (α1) is thus increasing in domestic spillovers (ε1), and decreasing in foreign
spillovers (ε2). It is α1 = 12 when spillovers are symmetric across countries.
We see that the optimal ownership pattern depends only on the technology parameters
ε1, ε2,Q and the cost of public funds (1 + λ). If the spillovers are asymmetric (ε1 6= ε2),
the firm will prefer an uneven distribution of its owner shares. From the point of view of
the firm, the country where spillovers are largest is the most favorable. If the firm has a
larger owner share in that country, its government will be less eager to extract the firm’s
rents, and this will increase total investments and thereby the profits of the firm.
A relevant question to consider is whether the ownership pattern preferred by the firm
is also the best from a social point of view. The model turns out to generate a simple
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answer to this question. Measuring total social surplus by W = W1 +W2 we have the
following result:
Proposition 5 The ownership pattern (α1,α2) that maximises the firm’s rents in com-
mon agency will also maximise the (equilibrium) total surplus W = W1 +W2 if and only
if α1 = α2 = 12 . If the firm’s preferred pattern entails majority ownership in one country,
e.g. α1 > α2, the majority owner share is (locally) too large from a social point of view,
since then dWdα1 < 0.
To get some intuition for this result, suppose technologies are symmetric except for
ε1 > ε2. As explained above, the firm prefers the owner distribution that maximises
(marginal) rents m(K1 +K2), which entails α1 > α2 and K1 > K2. It turns out that this
outcome implies excessively high investments in country 1, in the sense that total welfare
would increase if investments had been shifted from country 1 to country 2. But such
shifting is precisely what will take place (in equilibrium) if owner shares are reallocated to
reduce α1 and increase α2. Hence we see that the owner share α1 which is most preferred
by the firm, is in this case too high from a social point of view.
6 Conclusion
With enhanced international mobility of the corporate tax base, tax competition is rein-
forced and national governments experience more problems in raising revenue. Foreign
direct investments have been rapidly increasing, and recent empirical research shows that
eﬀective tax rates are important factors for determining the localisation decisions of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs).25 We have considered a situation where two jurisdictions
compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise,
whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms. The competition among
the countries to tax the firm’s rents is modelled as common agency. An advantage of the
common agency approach is that it enables the tax systems to be endogenously deter-
mined, based on informational considerations. (In contrast, the tax competition literature
typically imposes exogenous constraints on the available tax instruments.)
The firm contributes to local welfare by spillovers, by tax payments and by dividends
paid to local investors, and it has private information both about its eﬃciency and about
25See, e.g., Markusen (1995), Devereux and Freeman (1995).
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spillovers. In this setting, we compare equilibria under tax competition and tax coordi-
nation. We allow for asymmetric equilibria, i.e., cases where spillover eﬀects and national
ownership diﬀer between the two countries. It is shown that by going from tax competition
to tax coordination, the governments can avoid excessive investments in one of the coun-
tries (the country that has the lowest spillovers). Tax coordination can aslo make sure
that investments are properly concentrated in the country where spillovers are largest,
i.e., avoid that investments are too much spread out. It is also shown that the firm may
actually gain by governmental tax coordination, and we demonstrate that the firm and
the governments may have diﬀerent preferences with respect to the national distribution
of ownership in the firm.
The tax literature normally assumes that any one firm is too small to aﬀect tax policy
in a jurisdiction. We assume that the MNE is a large and unique firm with a high level of
spillovers, or that the jurisdictions are small, so that the potential tax revenues and the
possible knowledge spillovers from the firm are non-negligible relative to the corporate tax
bases and the knowledge bases of the two jurisdictions. An alternative interpretation is
that the tax subject in the model is a mobile industry.
We assumed that the firm has private information about its eﬃciency, whereas its in-
vestment levels have been assumed to be subject to commonly known information. Profits
may to a large extent may be observable for purely domestic firms, and be captured by a
traditional corporate income tax. For multinational firms, transfer pricing may make any
attempt to measure profits diﬃcult, so that countries are forced to estimate profits based
on what is observable. Our assumption is that investments are the key observable variable,
and the tax schemes derived are made contingent on the national investment levels.26
It has also been assumed in this paper that the firm cannot completely escape taxation
in one country by moving all of its operations to the other country. To understand some
of the ramifications of this assumption, suppose instead that such moves are feasible for
the firm. This imposes additional participation constraints on the principals; the firm’s
(equilibrium) rent must then be at least as large as what the firm can obtain by escaping
26Privately observed investments that are undertaken after the tax system is in place (moral hazard)
can be accomodated in the model; the profit function can be interpreted as an indirect function where
such investments are chosen optimally, conditional on the observable Kj ’s. Privately observed investments
in place ex ante would, however, be a part of the firm’s private information. The model represents a case
where the aggregate eﬀect of sveral such variables can be captured by a one-dimensional parameter.
26
any one country. It appears that (at least for some functional forms) these additional
constraints will only aﬀect the distribution of rents between the parties: except for lump-
sum rent transfers, the equilibrium allocation will be the same as before.27
We have assumed that the MNE’s eﬃciency levels are perfectly correlated in the two
countries of operation. Uncorrelated eﬃciency parameters may be relevant if firms invest
in diﬀerent countries to diversify portfolios. Pivate information about investment lev-
els, or uncorrelated information parameters, may represent interesting extensions of the
present model. However, each of these extensions would imply a multidimensional screen-
ing problem (i.e. a challenge for the government to reveal a vector of parameters subject
to private information), which is not yet fully solved, not even in a single-principal setting;
see Rochet and Chone (1998).
Appendix
The non-cooperative equilibrium conditions.
Given the tax function oﬀered by country 2, we can use the Revelation Principle to
find the optimal response28 from country 1. The MNE’s profits as a function of its re-
port θˆ1 to country 1 and its true type are given by π(θˆ1, θ) = Π(K1(θˆ1),K2(θˆ1), θ) −
R1(K1(θˆ1)) − R2(K2(θˆ1)), where the firm’s investments in country 2 satisfy K2(θˆ1) =
argmaxK2 [Π(K1(θˆ1),K2, θ)− R2(K2)]. Incentive compatibility requires that the firm re-
ports truthfully (θˆ1 = θ), which implies that (4) must hold for equilibrium profits. Inte-
grating by parts, and using (4), the expected welfare in country 1 may be written
EW =
Z θ¯
θ
{(1 + λ) (Π(K1(θ),K2(θ), θ) +E1(K1(θ), θ))−R2(K2(θ)))
−(1 + λ− α1)
∂Π(K1(θ),K2(θ), θ)
∂θ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¾
dF (θ).
27Technically, the new participation constraint facing principal j will apparently bind only for the least
eﬃcient type. Calzolari (1998) also makes this point. This means that the countries cannot, when they
compete, completely tax away all rents from the least eﬃcient type of firm; even this type will keep some
(mobility) rents. In this case, therefore, types with low eﬃciency will in general be better oﬀ under tax
competition compared to tax coordination. More eﬃcient types apparently may or may not be better oﬀ
in the competitive regime.
28For a given tax function oﬀered by country 2, it is not restrictive to consider only direct truthtelling
mechanisms in country 1’s best response problem; the Revelation Principle holds for this single-principal
problem. Restricting both principals simultaneously to such mechanisms, however, does in general aﬀect
the equilibrium.
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Maximising the integrand pointwise with respect to K1 and K2, subject to (6), yields a
first-order condition that takes the form (7) (with j = 1 and i = 2) when we substitute
for R002(K2(θ)) from (6). (The relevant expression for R002() is found by diﬀerentiating (6)
with respect to θ.) This condition characterises the equilibrium contract for country 1.
It should also be checked that the solution is commonly implementable. In partic-
ular, it must be optimal for the firm to make the targeted investments K1(θ),K2(θ).
This requires that Π(K1,K2, θ) − ΣjRj(Kj) is locally concave at the point (K1,K2) =
(K1(θ),K2(θ)). Making use of (6), the necessary local concavity conditions can then be
written as K 01K 02
∂2Π
∂K1∂K2
+ ∂
2Π
∂θ∂Ki
K 0i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, and
K 01K02
³
∂2Π
∂θ∂K1
∂2Π
∂θ∂K2
+ ∂
2Π
∂K1∂K2
h
∂2Π
∂θ∂K1
K 01 +
∂2Π
∂θ∂K2
K 02
i´
≥ 0. These conditions are also suﬃ-
cient in the case of quadratic functions and contract substitutes, provided both investment
schedules are nondecreasing (cf. Stole (1992), Thm. 11, p. 22).
For the parametrisations given in Section 5, where ∂
2Π
∂θ∂Ki
= m and ∂
2Π
∂K1∂K2
= −a, the
implementability conditions amount to
0 ≤ a
m
K0j ≤ 1 j = 1, 2 and
a
m
K01 +
a
m
K 02 ≤ 1. (13)
By insertion of Kj(θ) = K0j · θ + Lj in (7), we further see that the slope parameters (K 0j)
in the parametric model must satisfy
(m+ ej)− (q + a)K 0j − aK 0i = −
1 + λ− αj
1 + λ
"
m+
maK 0i
aK0j −m
#
, j = 1, 2, (14)
Proof of Proposition 2.
In the symmetric case, first-best investments are given byKjF (θ) = ma
µ
(1+ε)
Q+1 θ +
k
m
Q+1
¶
≡
K 0jF · θ + LjF , where ε = em and Q = qa + 1. The cooperative solution is KjC(θ) =
K 0jC · θ + LjC , where K 0jC = K 0jF + ma γQ+1 , γ = 1+λ−2α11+λ .
From (14) we find that the non-cooperative equilibrium investments satisfy K0j =
m
a x,
where
x = 12(1+Q)
³
ε+ 2 +Q+ 2γ1 −
p
ε2 − 2Qε+ 4εγ1 + 4γ1 +Q2 + 4γ21
´
,
and γ1 = 1− α11+λ . Comparing the slopes of the investment schedules for the cooperative
and the non-cooperative solutions we have
1−
K 0jC
K 0j
= 1−
1+ε+γ
Q+1
x
=
−ε+Q+ 2(γ1 − γ)−
p
ε2 − 2Qε+ 4εγ1 + 4γ1 +Q2 + 4γ21
2(Q+ 1)x
,
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where γ = 1 − 2α11+λ , so γ1 − γ =
α1
1+λ . There is underinvestment in common agency
relative to the cooperative case iﬀ K0j > K
0
jC , i.e. iﬀ −ε + Q + 2 (γ1 − γ) > 0 and
(−ε+Q+ 2 (γ1 − γ))2 >
¡
ε2 − 2Qε+ 4εγ1 + 4γ1 +Q2 + 4γ21
¢
. The latter inequality means
−ε (2γ1 − γ)+Q (γ1 − γ)+γ (γ − 2γ1)−γ1 > 0. Noting that 2γ1−γ = 1, the last inequality
is equivalent to −ε+Q (γ1 − γ)−γ−γ1 > 0. This yields K 0j > K 0jC iﬀ
q
a+4 >
1+λ
α1
( em+2).
QED
Proof of Proposition 3.
As a first step we compare non-cooperative and first-best investments. For that pur-
pose we use the following lemma, which is proved below.
Lemma. For any e1 ≥ 0 such that e1m ≤ ε01 =
(Q−1)Q
Q+γ1
, the following holds: Equa-
tions (14) yield unique solutions for the slopes K01,K02 that satisfy the implementability
conditions (13). As e1 → ε01m, we have K01 → ma and K 02 → 0.
From this lemma we can conclude that for a spillover parameter e1 suﬃciently close to
mε01 (so that ε1 is close to ε
0
1), the common-agency investment schedulesKj(θ) = K
0
j ·θ+Lj
have slopes K01 ≈ ma in country 1 and K 02 ≈ 0 in country 2. We now compare these slopes
to the slopes of the corresponding first-best schedules.
The latter slopes are, for ε1 = ε01, given by K
0
1F =
m
a
(1+ε01)Q−1
Q2−1 and K
0
2F =
m
a
Q−(1+ε01)
Q2−1 .
Note that ε01 < Q − 1, and hence
¡
1 + ε01
¢
Q < Q2, which implies K01F <
m
a . Also
Q−
¡
1 + ε01
¢
= (Q− 1) γ1Q+γ1 , so K
0
2F >
m
a
1
Q+1 > 0. This shows that for ε1 close to ε
0
1 we
have K01 > K1F and K 02 < K 02F . Hence for spillovers such that e1 is close to mε
0
1, it is
the case that the common-agency investment schedules entail overinvestment in country
2 and underinvestment in country 1 relative to first-best investments.
The cooperative investment schedules have slopes K 0jC = K
0
jF + γ
m
a
1
Q+1 , where γ =
1 − 2α1+λ . For country 2 K02 < K 02C follows from K 02 < K 02F . Setting e2 = 0 and letting
e1 →mε01 we find K01F → ma
(1+ε01)Q−1
Q2−1 , and hence
K01C →
m
a
(1 + ε01)Q− 1
Q2 − 1 + γ
m
a
1
Q− 1 =
m
a(Q+ 1)
·
Q2
Q+ γ1
+ 2γ1
¸
,
where the last equality follows from the definition of ε01 and the fact that γ = 2γ1−1. From
the lemma above we know that the non-cooperative solution satisfies K 01 → ma in this case.
In the limit we thus have non-cooperative investments being lower than cooperative ones
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in country 1 iﬀ ma >
m
a(Q+1)
h
Q2
Q+γ1
+ 2γ1
i
. This condition is equivalent to the condition
given in Proposition 3
It then only remains to prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma. Define ”normalized” slope parameters xj = amK
0
j. In terms of these
parameters, equations (14) take the form
1+ ε1−Qx1−x2 = −γ1
·
1 +
x2
x1 − 1
¸
, 1+ ε2−Qx2−x1 = −γ1
·
1 +
x1
x2 − 1
¸
. (15)
with ε2 = 0. From the second of these equations it follows that x1 =
1−Qx2+γ1
1−x2+γ1
(1 − x2)
(provided 1− x2 + γ1 6= 0). Substituting this into the first, we find that x2 is a root of a
third-order equation Ax32 +Bx
2
2 +Cx2 +D ≡ P (x2) = 0, where
A = Q3 −Q, B = −2Q2γ1 −Q2 + ε1Q+ 3Q− 2Q3 + 2Qγ1
C = 3Q2γ1 − 3Qγ1 +Q3 − 3Q− 2ε1Q− ε1γ1 + 2Q2 − ε1γ1Q
D = (γ1 + 1)
¡
ε1γ1 +Q−Q2 + ε1Q
¢
We look for a solution pair that satisfies the implementability conditions 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1 and
x1 + x2 ≤ 1. The polynomial satisfies P (0) = D and P (1) = ε1γ21 > 0. It has a root in
[0, 1) iﬀ D ≤ 0, and there is then only one root in this interval. The root is positive when
D < 0. Note that D ≤ 0 for ε1 ≤ Q Q−1γ1+Q = ε
0
1. For 0 < ε1 ≤ ε01 there is thus a unique
root satisfying 0 ≤ x2 < 1, and the root is x2 = 0 iﬀ ε1 = ε01.
It follows that x1 =
1−Qx2+γ1
1−x2+γ1
(1 − x2) satisfies 0 < x1 ≤ 1, with x1 = 1 iﬀ x2 = 0.
Note also that the formula for x1 yields x1 + x2 − 1 = (1−Q)x21−x2+γ1 (1 − x2). Thus we have
x1+x2 ≤ 1 with equality iﬀ x2 = 0., i.e. iﬀ ε1 = ε01. These results prove the lemma. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4.
There are admissible solutions (i.e. solutions that satisfy common implementability)
if owner shares are not too diﬀerent across countries, and if spillovers are not too large
(2εj < Q−1). We shall first prove that optimal owner shares (given an interior admissible
solution) require
2x2 −
ε2
Q− 1 = 2x1 −
ε1
Q− 1 . (16)
where xj = amK
0
j . We seek the owner shares that maximise
P
jmKj(θ), or equivalently,
minimise
P
jmK
0
j =
m2
a (x1+x2). Consider (1+λ)
∂
∂α1
(x1+x2) = − ∂∂γ1 (x1+x2)+
∂
∂γ2
(x1+
30
x2). At an (interior) optimum we must have ∂x1∂γ1 +
∂x2
∂γ1
= ∂x1
∂γ2
+ ∂x2
∂γ2
. From (15) we get
∂xj
∂γj
=
1
∆
·
1 +
xi
xj − 1
¸µ
Q+ γi
xj
(xi − 1)2
¶
, (17)
∂xi
∂γj
=
−1
∆
·
1 +
xi
xj − 1
¸µ
1− γi
xi − 1
¶
,
where ∆ is the determinant of the system (15). Substituting for these derivatives we ob-
tain ∂xj
∂γj
+ ∂xi
∂γj
= 1∆
h
1 + xixj−1
i h³
Q+ γi
xj
(xi−1)2
´
−
³
1− γixi−1
´i
. The condition for optimal
owner shares is therefore 1x1−1
h
Q+ γ2
x1
(x2−1)2
− 1 + γ2x2−1
i
= 1x2−1
h
Q+ γ1
x2
(x1−1)2
− 1 + γ1x1−1
i
.
This yields (Q−1)(x2−1)+γ2
h
1 + x1x2−1
i
= (Q−1)(x1−1)+γ1
h
1 + x2x1−1
i
. Substituting
from (15) we then get (Q−1)(x2−1)−1−ε2+Qx2+x1 = (Q−1)(x1−1)−1−ε1+Qx1+x2.
Rearranging terms yields the condition (16) stated above.
We have now three equations (15 and 16) to solve for the three unknown variables
x1, x2, γ1. (Given that α1 + α2 = 1, we have γ1 + γ2 = 2 − 11+λ = G, and γ2 can be
replaced by G−γ1.) The system yields γ1 = G2 +
1
8ε
2(Q−2)−ε−2ε1+2τ
(Q−1)(1−τ) , where ε = ε2−ε1, and
τ ∈ (12
ε
Q−1 , 1) is the solution to τ
2+Bτ+C = 0, with −(Q+1)B = ε+2G+2ε1+2 (Q+ 2)
and (Q+1)C = 2(2+ ε+G+2ε1)− 14(Q−1)ε
2. From these relations and γ1 = 1− α11+λ we
can verify the statements regarding the optimal α1. QED
Proof of Proposition 5.
For α1 + α2 = 1 we have W = (1 + λ)(E1 + E2 + Π) − λπ and thus 11+λ
∂W
∂α1
=
Σj(
∂Ej
∂Kj
+ ∂Π
∂Kj
)
∂Kj
∂α1
− λ1+λ
∂π
∂α1
. At the combination α1,α2 that is optimal for the firm we have
(uniformly in θ) ∂π
∂α1
= 0 and so ∂W
∂α1
has the same sign as Σjγj[m+
maK0i
aK0j−m
]
∂Kj
∂α1
. (Here we
have substituted for ∂Ej
∂Kj
+ ∂Π
∂Kj
from the equilibrium conditions (7) and used the quadratic
functional forms.) Recall that π is maximised when mK1 +mK2 is at a maximum, and
so at the firm’s optimum it holds ∂K1
∂α1
= −∂K2
∂α1
. Using this fact and the definition xj =
a
mK
0
j we then see that
∂W
∂α1
has the same sign as
n
γ1
h
1 + x2x1−1
i
− γ2
h
1 + x1x2−1
io
∂K1
∂α1
.
Substituting from (15) we find that the expression in curly brackets may be written as
− [1 + ε1 −Qx1 − x2]+[1 + ε2 −Qx2 − x1], which again is equal to (ε2−ε1)+(Q−1)(x1−
x2). Condition (16) shows that the last sum equals 12(ε2 − ε1). Thus we have found that
∂W
∂α1
has the same sign as (ε2−ε1)∂K1∂α1 . It can be seen from the equilibrium conditions (15)
that ∂K1
∂α1
> 0. The statements in the proposition then follow from the properties of the
optimal α1 in Proposition 4.
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